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Abstract 
In this paper the euro crisis is viewed as the most recent episode of the crisis of finance-
dominated capitalism. Therefore, two major features of finance-dominated capitalism, the 
increasing inequality of income distribution and the rising imbalances of current accounts, are 
analysed for a set of major Euro area countries. Against this background the euro crisis is 
examined, and it is shown that the economic policy reactions of European governments and 
institutions, narrowly interpreting the crisis as a sovereign debt crisis caused by irresponsible 
behaviour of some member country governments, are misguided and will lead to deflationary 
stagnation and an increasing risk of disintegration of the Euro area. For this reason, finally an 
alternative macroeconomic policy approach tackling the basic contradictions of finance-
dominated capitalism and the deficiencies of European economic policy institutions and 
economic policy strategies is outlined. It is argued that, on the one hand, an institution which 
convincingly guarantees public debt of Euro area member countries and, on the other hand, an 
expansionary macroeconomic policy approach, in particular in the current account surplus 
countries of the Euro area, need to be introduced. 
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1. Introduction 
The financial and economic crises in Europe have occurred against the background of the 
long-run developments imposed by finance-dominated capitalism and neo-liberalism since the 
early 1980s. These developments have been characterised by de-regulation of national and 
international goods, labour and financial markets, in particular, re-distribution of income at 
the expense of (low) wages, and rising imbalances of current accounts at the global level and 
at regional levels, in particular within the European Monetary Union since its inception in 
1999. The financial and economic crises, which started with the collapse of the subprime 
mortgage market in the US in 2007, which gained momentum by the breakdown of Lehmann 
Brothers in 2008 and which led to a serious recession at the world scale with a decline in real 
GDP in many advanced capitalist economies not seen for generations in 2008/09, has turned 
into a currency crisis, the euro crisis since 2010. This crisis is threatening the further existence 
of the euro because of the specific institutional conditions for economic policy making in the 
Euro area. First, the explicit guarantee of public debt of member countries by the monetary 
authority of the currency union, the European Central Bank (ECB), is excluded from the 
treaties and regulations of the EU. Therefore, member country governments issue debt in a 
common currency, the euro, but not in their own currency, in the sense that their own central 
bank would guarantee the monetisation of this debt if required. Second, fiscal transfers among 
member countries have also been ruled out by the treaties, so that government debt of a single 
member country is not guaranteed by the community of member country governments as a 
whole. Third, there have been no efficient mechanisms to prevent the building up of internal 
and external macroeconomic imbalances across the Euro area countries, which in the crisis 
contributed to the rapid increases in government deficits and debt and to the massive doubts 
regarding the creditworthiness of some member countries, given the first two deficiencies. 
In this paper we interpret the euro crisis as the most recent episode of the crisis of 
finance-dominated capitalism. Therefore, we will first analyse the dimensions of increasing 
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inequality for the major European countries during the period of finance-dominated 
capitalism. Our analysis will focus on the Euro area member countries Austria, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. Having 
analysed the trends towards increasing inequality, we will then deal with the current account 
imbalances within the Euro area which have developed in the trade cycle prior to the crisis 
and distinguish two extreme types of development, the debt-led consumption boom type and 
the export-led mercantilist type. Against this background we will then examine the euro crisis 
and the misguided economic policy reactions by European governments and European 
institutions. Since the dysfunctional economic policy institutions and misguided economic 
policy making are threatening the further existence of the euro as a currency, we will finally 
draft an alternative macroeconomic policy approach overcoming these deficiencies. The final 
section will sum up and conclude. 
 
2. Rising inequality in the period of finance-dominated capitalism and neo-liberalism – 
the European case 
The neo-liberal period since the early 1980s and the emergence of finance-dominated 
capitalism have been associated with considerable redistribution of income also in major 
European countries.1 With respect to functional income distribution we observe a massive 
redistribution at the expense of labour and in favour of broad capital income. The labour 
income share, as a measure taken from the national accounts and corrected for the changes in 
the composition of employment regarding employees and self-employed, has shown a falling 
trend in most of the Euro area member countries considered here since the early 1980s, with 
cyclical fluctuations due to the well known counter-cyclical properties of the labour income 
share. In order to eliminate cyclical fluctuations of the labour income share, we have 
calculated cyclical averages for the three trade cycles from the early 1980s until 2008 (Table 
                                                 
1
 For similar analysis on a broader set of countries see Hein (2011a, 2011b, 2012) and Hein/Mundt (2012). 
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1). On average over the cycle the labour income share has fallen in all countries in our data set 
but Portugal, from the first cycle (early 1980s to the early 1990s) to the third cycle (early 
2000s until 2008). The fall has been most substantial in Austria and Ireland with more than 10 
percentage points of GDP at factor costs, and in Greece, Italy, France and Spain with more 
than 5 percentage points of GDP. In Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands the labour 
income share has fallen by less than 5 percentage points of GDP at factor costs.  
 
Table 1: Labour income share as percentage of GDP at current 
factor costs, average values over the trade cycle, early 1980s – 
2008 
 1. Early 
1980s – 
early 1990s 
2. Early 
1990s – 
early 2000s 
3. Early 
2000s – 
2008 
Change (3. 
– 1.), 
percentage 
points 
Austria 75.66 70.74 65.20 -10.46 
Belgium 70.63 70.74 69.16 -1.47 
France 71.44 66.88 65.91 -5.53 
Germany 67.11 66.04 63.34 -3.77 
Greecea) 67.26 62.00 60.60 -6.66 
Ireland 70.34 60.90 55.72 -14.61 
Italy 68.31 63.25 62.37 -5.95 
Netherlands 68.74 67.21 65.57 -3.17 
Portugal 65.73 70.60 71.10 5.37 
Spain 68.32 66.13 62.41 -5.91 
Notes: The labour income share is given by the compensation per employee 
divided by GDP at factor costs per person employed. The beginning of a 
trade cycle is given by a local minimum of annual real GDP growth in the 
respective country. 
a)
 adjusted to fit in 3 cycle pattern 
Source: European Commission (2010), author’s calculations 
 
Three main channels through which financialisation and neo-liberalism have negatively 
affected the share of direct labour in national income can be identified (Hein 2011b, 2012, 
chapter 2). First, the sectoral composition of the economy has changed in favour of the high 
profit share financial corporations and at the expense of the non-financial corporate sector and 
the government sector with lower or zero profit shares. Second, overhead costs, in particular 
top management salaries and interest payments, and profit claims imposed on the corporate 
 4 
sector by shareholders have increased. This has caused the mark-up on direct unit labour costs 
in pricing of firms in incompletely competitive markets to rise and the share of labour income 
to fall, because the mark-up has to cover overhead costs and profit claims. Third, bargaining 
power of workers and trade unions has been weakened, triggered by shareholder value 
orientation and short-termism of management, increasing relevance of the financial sector 
with weak trade unions relative to the non-financial and the government sector with stronger 
trade unions, the threat-effect of liberalisation and globalisation of finance and trade, 
deregulation of the labour market, and downsizing or abandoning government demand 
management policies. 
With respect to personal income distribution increasing inequality can be observed in 
many of the European countries in our data set from the mid 1980s until the mid 2000s. 
Taking the Gini coefficient as an indicator, this is true for the distribution of market income, 
with France and the Netherlands being exceptions (Table 2). In Germany, Italy and Portugal 
the Gini coefficient has risen most considerably. If we include redistribution via taxes and 
social policies by the state, Belgium, France, Greece, Ireland and Spain have not seen an 
increase in their Gini coefficients, with considerable declines in Spain, France and Greece. 
The other countries, however, have also experienced an increasing inequality in disposable 
income in the period of neo-liberalism and finance-dominated capitalism. This increase was 
particularly pronounced in Austria, Germany, Italy, and Portugal. Although tax and social 
policies have reduced income inequality in all the countries under investigation, in many 
countries this has not prevented an increase in inequality over time. This is also the 
conclusion the OECD (2008) draws for a broader set of countries and from the application of 
other measures of income inequality. 
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Table 2. Gini coefficient before and after taxes 
Gini coefficient before taxes 
Country mid-70s mid-80s around 
1990 
mid-90s around 
2000 
mid-
2000s 
Change 
from mid 
80s to 
mid 
2000s 
Austria … … … … … 0.43 … 
Belgium … 0.45 … 0.47 0.46 0.49 0.04 
France … 0.52 0.51 0.48 0.50 0.48 -0.04 
Germany  0.44 0.42 0.46 0.48 0.51 0.07 
Greece … … … … … … … 
Ireland … … … … 0.43 0.42 … 
Italy  0.42 0.44 0.51 0.52 0.56 0.14 
Netherlands 0.42 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.42 0.42 -0.05 
Portugal 0.46 … 0.44 0.49 0.48 0.54 0.08a) 
Spain … … … … ... … … 
 
Gini coefficient after taxes 
Country mid-70s mid-80s around 
1990 
mid-90s around 
2000 
mid-
2000s 
Change 
from mid 
80s to 
mid 
2000s 
Austria … 0.24 … 0.24 0.25 0.27 0.03 
Belgium … 0.27 … 0.29 0.29 0.27 0.00 
France … 0.31 0.30 0.28 0.28 0.28 -0.03 
Germany … 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.30 0.04 
Greece 0.41 0.34 … 0.34 0.34 0.32 -0.02 
Ireland … 0.33 … 0.32 0.30 0.33 0.00 
Italy … 0.31 0.30 0.35 0.34 0.35 0.04 
Netherlands 0.25 0.26 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.01 
Portugal 0.35 … 0.33 0.36 0.36 0.38 0.03 a) 
Spain … 0.37 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.32 -0.05 
Notes: Data refer to cash income of households and are broken down to individuals. The income 
attributed to each individual is adjusted for household size, but does not distinguish between adults and 
children. 
a) change from mid 70s to mid 2000s 
Source: OECD (2010), author’s calculations 
 
3. Imbalances in the Euro area 
Against the background of rising inequality in personal income distribution in many countries 
and falling labour income shares associated with financialisation and neo-liberalism since the 
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early 1980s, different ‘types of capitalism under financialisation’ have developed,2 which are 
complementary and which have fed rising current account imbalances in the world economy, 
but also at regional levels, and in particular so in the Euro area. The current account of the 
Euro area has been roughly balanced on average over the cycle from the early 2000s – 2008 
(European Commission 2010), so that in the aggregate current account surplus member 
countries have their respective deficit counterparts within the Euro area. Of course, individual 
Euro member states also have surpluses or deficits vis-à-vis the non-Euro area rest of the 
world. But these roughly cancel out for the Euro area in the aggregate.  
Distinguishing the ‘types of capitalism under financialisation’, first, we have the ‘debt-
led consumption boom’ type; second, there has developed a counterpart, the ‘export-led 
mercantilist’ type; and third, in between these two extremes we have the ‘domestic demand-
led’ type. In the ‘debt-led consumption boom’ type it is debt-financed consumption demand 
which allows for flourishing aggregate demand and the realisation of rising profits against the 
background of redistribution at the expense of (low) labour incomes and stagnating real 
investment, as another feature of finance-dominated capitalism.3 In the ‘export-led 
mercantilist’ type it is export surpluses which stabilise aggregate demand and take care of the 
realisation of profits.4 The third type, the ‘domestic demand-led’ type, can neither rely on 
export surpluses, which distinguishes it from the second type, nor on flourishing debt-
financed consumption, which distinguishes it from the first type. 
Since the intra Euro area current account imbalances have exploded in particular since 
the early 2000s (Figure 1), in the course of recovery from the burst of the new economy boom 
of the late 1990s, we take cyclical average data for the trade cycle of the early 2000s until the 
                                                 
2
 For similar analyses for the global scale see van Treeck/Hein/Dünhaupt (2007), Bibow (2008), Fitoussi/Stiglitz 
(2009), UNCTAD (2009), van Treeck (2009), Wade (2009), Hein/Truger (2011), Stockhammer (2010a, 2010b), 
and Hein/Mundt (2012). 
3
 On the depressing effects of finance-dominated capitalism, or ‘financialisation’, on investment in real capital 
stock see Hein (2012, chapter 3) and the references provided there. 
4
 Note that from national accounting we obtain: Gross profits net of taxes = Gross investment + Export surplus + 
Government budget deficit – Worker’s saving + Capitalists’ consumption (Kalecki 1971, p. 82). 
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2008/9 crisis to distinguish these models and allocate the countries examined in this paper to 
them. 
 
Figure 1: 
Current account in billions ECU/euro, selected Euro area countries, 1995 – 2010 
-300.0
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Source: European Commission (2011a), author’s representation. 
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Table 3a: Key macroeconomic variables for ‘debt-led consumption boom’ economies,  
average values for the trade cycle from the early 2000s – 2008 
 Greece Ireland Spain 
Financial balances of external sector as a share of nominal GDP, per cent 12.49 2.88 7.10 
Financial balances of public sector as share of nominal GDP, per cent -5.74 -0.13 -0.03 
Financial balance of private sector as a share of nominal GDP, per cent -6.75 -2.74 -7.07 
Financial balance of private household sector as a share of nominal GDP, per cent -11.44 -6.29 -1.54 
Financial balance of the corporate sector as a share of nominal GDP, per cent 4.69 3.55 -5.53 
    
Real GDP growth, per cent 3.89 3.92 3.02 
Growth contribution of domestic demand including stocks, percentage points 4.10 3.26 3.82 
Growth contribution of private consumption, percentage points 2.79 1.87 1.74 
Growth contribution of public consumption, percentage points 0.49 0.59 0.93 
Growth contribution of gross fixed capital formation, percentage points 0.79 0.79 1.14 
Growth contribution of the balance of goods and services, percentage points -0.20 0.66 -0.81 
Net exports of goods and services as a share of nominal GDP, per cent -10.97 12.23 -4.69 
    
Change in labour income, share as percentage of GDP at current factor costs, from previous 
cycle, percentage points 
-1.40 -5.17 -3.71 
Growth rate of nominal unit labour costs, per cent 3.47 3.95 3.31 
Inflation (HCPI growth rate), per cent 3.41 3.50 3.33 
Growth rate of nominal effective exchange rates (relative to 23 countries), per cent 1.60 2.81 1.53 
Growth rate of real effective exchange rates (relative to 23 countries), per cent 2.91 4.97 2.82 
Notes: The beginning of a trade cycle is given by a local minimum of annual real GDP growth in the respective country 
Source: European Commission (2010), author’s calculations 
 
 9 
 
Table 3b: Key macroeconomic variables for ‘export-led mercantilist’ economies,  
average values for the trade cycle from the early 2000s – 2008 
 Austria Belgium Germany Nether-
lands 
Financial balances of external sector as a share of nominal GDP, per cent -2.26 -3.90 -5.55 -7.15 
Financial balances of public sector as share of nominal GDP, per cent -1.45 -0.56 -2.09 -0.85 
Financial balance of private sector as a share of nominal GDP, per cent 3.70 4.46 7.64 8.00 
Financial balance of private household sector as a share of nominal GDP, per cent 4.68 4.25 5.90 0.16 
Financial balance of the corporate sector as a share of nominal GDP, per cent -0.98 0.21 1.74 7.84 
     
Real GDP growth, per cent 2.13 1.84 1.44 1.96 
Growth contribution of domestic demand including stocks, percentage points 1.26 1.70 0.85 1.43 
Growth contribution of private consumption, percentage points 0.76 0.63 0.18 0.37 
Growth contribution of public consumption, percentage points 0.28 0.45 0.16 0.75 
Growth contribution of gross fixed capital formation, percentage points 0.19 0.62 0.49 0.35 
Growth contribution of the balance of goods and services, percentage points 0.77 0.14 0.58 0.52 
Net exports of goods and services as a share of nominal GDP, per cent 4.35 4.02 5.56 7.63 
     
Change in labour income, share as percentage of GDP at current factor costs, from 
previous cycle, percentage points 
-5.54 -1.58 -2.71 -1.64 
Growth rate of nominal unit labour costs, per cent 1.05 2.02 0.17 1.88 
Inflation (HCPI growth rate), per centa) 2.12 2.34 1.78 1.94 
Growth rate of nominal effective exchange rates (relative to 23 countries), per cent 1.21 1.48 2.09 1.37 
Growth rate of real effective exchange rates (relative to 23 countries), per cent 0.55 1.58 0.14 1.56 
Notes: The beginning of a trade cycle is given by a local minimum of annual real GDP growth in the respective country 
Source: European Commission (2010), author’s calculations 
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Table 3c: Key macroeconomic variables for ‘domestic demand-led’ economies,  
average values for the trade cycle from the early 2000s – 2008 
 France Italy Portugal 
Financial balances of external sector as a share of nominal GDP, per cent 1.25 1.59 9.40 
Financial balances of public sector as share of nominal GDP, per cent -3.18 -3.16 -3.65 
Financial balance of private sector as a share of nominal GDP, per cent 1.93 1.57 -5.75 
Financial balance of private household sector as a share of nominal GDP, per cent 3.80 3.91 1.54 
Financial balance of the corporate sector as a share of nominal GDP, per cent -1.87 -2.34 -7.29 
    
Real GDP growth, per cent 1.64 0.73 0.82 
Growth contribution of domestic demand including stocks, percentage points 2.13 0.81 1.04 
Growth contribution of private consumption, percentage points 1.24 0.44 1.05 
Growth contribution of public consumption, percentage points 0.38 0.27 0.20 
Growth contribution of gross fixed capital formation, percentage points 0.56 0.08 -0.25 
Growth contribution of the balance of goods and services, percentage points -0.50 -0.08 -0.19 
Net exports of goods and services as a share of nominal GDP, per cent -0.52 -0.07 -8.08 
    
Change in labour income, share as percentage of GDP at current factor costs, from previous 
cycle, percentage points 
-0.97 -0.88 0.49 
Growth rate of nominal unit labour costs, per cent 2.01 2.95 2.41 
Inflation (HCPI growth rate), per cent 1.98 2.36 2.68 
Growth rate of nominal effective exchange rates (relative to 23 countries), per cent 1.84 1.92 1.26 
Growth rate of real effective exchange rates (relative to 23 countries), per cent 1.98 3.12 1.59 
Notes: The beginning of a trade cycle is given by a local minimum of annual real GDP growth in the respective country 
Source: European Commission (2010), author’s calculations 
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Figure 2a 
Residental property prices for Austria, Germany and Portugal, 
1995 - 2009, Index 2000 = 1, 
Source: BIS (2010), author's calculations
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Figure 2b 
Residental property prices for Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, Ireland, 
the Netherlands and Spain, 1995 - 2009,
 Index 2000 = 1, 
Source: BIS (2010), author's calculations
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Table 4: Household gross debt and net wealth, per cent of annual disposable income 
 Gross debt Net wealth 
 1995 2000 2005 1995 2000 2005 
Austria 34 … 88 a) … … … 
Belgium 57 … 75 a) … … … 
France 66 78 89 461 547 752 
Germany 97 111 107 541 575 578 a) 
Greece … … … … … … 
Ireland 48 82 141 … 618 775 
Italy 32 46 59 702 820 936 a) 
Netherlands 113 175 246 369 528 515 
Portugal 54 … 125 a) … … … 
Spain 59 83 107 b) 540 646 935 b) 
Notes: a) 2006, b) 2004. Debt refers to total liabilities outstanding at the end of the period. Net wealth is 
defined as non-financial and financial assets minus liabilities. Data is from national statistics.  
Source: Girourard/Kennedy/Andre (2007, p. 9), Goodbody Stockbrokers (2009, p. 30) 
 
In the cycle of the early 2000s, the ‘debt-led consumption boom’ type can be found in Greece, 
Ireland, and Spain (Table 3a). All these economies have seen considerable increases in 
residential property prices and/or in wealth-income ratios in the period considered here (Table 
4, Figure 2b). This increase in notional wealth, together with liberalised financial markets and 
weakened conditions of creditworthiness, was conducive to soaring consumption demand and 
hence considerable growth contributions of private consumption and domestic demand. 
Relatively high real GDP growth as compared to the ‘export-led mercantilist’ countries, but 
negative financial balances (as a share of nominal GDP) of the private household sector and 
thus increasing private household debt were the consequences. This also translated into 
negative balances of the private sector as a whole – with the corporate sector being in surplus 
in all countries of this group except Spain. The public sector contributed to the negative 
domestic financial balance in all the countries, but to a different degree – considerably in 
Greece, but only marginally in Ireland and Spain – we will come back to this in more detail in 
the next section. Since aggregate domestic expenditures exceeded national income, these 
countries had to run current account deficits, i.e. the financial balances of the external sector 
were positive for each of the countries pursuing the ‘debt-led consumption boom’ type of 
 13 
development. In particular Greece and Spain had to rely on the inflow of foreign financial 
resources. Strong domestic demand growth in the ‘debt-led consumption boom countries’ was 
accompanied by negative growth contributions of the balance of goods and services in these 
countries but Ireland, where the growth contribution of external demand was positive, too.5 
Above Euro area average unit labour cost growth and inflation accompanied by nominal 
appreciation of the euro, and thus a loss of competitiveness of domestic producers (positive 
rates of change in the effective exchange rate) have contributed to the deficits in the balance 
of goods and services and in the current account. The ‘debt-led consumption boom’ 
economies were thus the Euro area demand engines of the cycle from the early 2000s – 2008. 
The counterparts to the ‘debt-led consumption boom’ economies at the Euro area level 
were the ‘export-led mercantilist’ economies. This group consists of Austria, Belgium, 
Germany, and the Netherlands (Table 3b). These economies were characterised by surpluses 
in their balances of goods and services and in their current accounts, i.e. the financial balances 
of the respective external sectors were in deficit. Although some of these countries (Belgium, 
the Netherlands) had seen considerable increases in wealth-income ratios and/or in residential 
property prices, whereas others had not (Austria, Germany) (Table 4, Figures 2a-b), financial 
balances of private households (as a share of nominal GDP) remained in surplus. The 
financial balances of the private sectors were strongly positive in each of these countries. 
Growth contributions of private consumption and domestic demand were moderate, as for 
Austria, Belgium, and the Netherlands, or very weak, as in the case of Germany, and these 
countries considerably relied on positive growth contributions of the balance of goods and 
services. Only in Belgium was the growth contribution of external demand rather small. The 
                                                 
5
 In the case of Ireland, the current account deficit (and the positive financial balance of the external sector) was 
not due to a deficit in external trade but rather a deficit in the flows of primary incomes. Although the balance of 
goods and services in Ireland was positive, we have not included it into the ‘export-led mercantilist’ group of 
countries discussed below, because Ireland, as the other ‘debt-led consumption boom’ countries, showed a 
negative balance of the private sector and of the domestic sectors as a whole. Surpluses in the balance of goods 
and services were thus required in order to meet the payment commitments associated with the negative balance 
of primary incomes and to avoid an even larger deficit in the current account. 
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basis for external surpluses were thus weak domestic demand, on the one hand, but also low 
unit labour cost growth and low inflation, on the other hand. For ‘export-led mercantilist’ 
Euro area countries the real effective exchange rate relative to 23 industrial economies 
increased to a lesser extent than in the ‘debt-led consumption boom’ Euro area countries, 
implying an increase in price competitiveness of the former relative to the latter. The ‘export-
led mercantilist’ countries have thus benefitted from regional demand being driven by the 
‘debt-led consumption boom’ countries. However, following this model came at a price: GDP 
growth in the export-led countries remained well below GDP growth in the debt-led 
economies, and in particular the more closed large economy of Germany performed even 
worse than the more open and smaller economies of Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands. 
In the cycle of the early 2000s to 2008, France, Italy and Portugal can neither be 
considered to have been ‘debt-led consumption boom’ economies nor ‘export-led 
mercantilist’ economies. Growth was rather domestic demand led. Although France and Italy 
saw significant increases in net wealth-income ratios and in residential property prices (Table 
4, Figure 2a), whereas Portugal did not (Figure 2b), financial balances of private households 
remained positive in all of the three countries. The corporate sector had negative balances in 
these countries and together with negative public sector balances this meant current account 
deficits, which were considerable particularly in Portugal.  
Although not experiencing a debt-led consumption boom, growth was driven by 
domestic demand in the face of rising (Portugal) or only weakly declining (France, Italy) 
labour income shares and considerable public deficits in each of the countries. The balances 
of goods and services were negative and so were the growth contributions of external demand. 
The loss of price competitiveness with respect to the ‘export-led mercantilist’ Euro area 
countries, i.e. higher unit labour cost growth and higher inflation than in these countries, may 
have contributed to the external deficit. GDP growth remained particularly weak in Portugal 
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and Italy, whereas France had higher growth than the stagnative mercantilist economy of 
Germany, but lower growth than the rest of the countries in our data set. 
 
4. Euro crises and misguided policy reactions 
When the crisis hit the European economies in 2008/09, the three ‘types of capitalism under 
financialisation’ outlined in the previous sections were affected and real GDP declined in all 
of the countries in our data set, in some of them considerably, without any clear pattern 
regarding the intensity of the crisis (European Commission 2011a). In the course of the crisis 
government deficits increased in order to stabilise the private real and financial sectors and 
government debt to GDP ratios jumped up (Figures 3 and 4). This seems to be the reason why 
the current euro crisis is considered as a crisis of government deficits and debt by many 
observers – above all by the dominating economic policy makers in Germany, the European 
Commission and the European Council.6 A first look at the developments might even seem to 
confirm this view. Since the start of the global financial crisis in 2007 the, up to that point in 
time, almost negligible spreads of government bonds of Euro area member states relative to 
the benchmark German bonds increased, most notably for Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and 
Spain (GIPS) (see Figure 5). This development continued, especially for Ireland and Greece 
and particularly so in mid-2009. In spring 2010, the development escalated dramatically again 
in the Greek case. Emergency measures had to be taken in order to prevent Greek government 
default.7 The relief provided by the rescue package for Greece (€ 110 Billion) by the Euro 
area countries and the IMF and the Euro rescue fund set up to prevent further problems for 
other governments proved to be very short-lived. In October 2010 spreads for Irish 
government bonds increased dramatically again so that in November of the same year, the 
                                                 
6
 See for example the argument of the German Federal Ministry of Finance (2011) in the German Stability 
Programme submitted to the European Commission and the European Council (2011a) in its proposal for the 
‘Euro Plus Pact’. 
7
 See European Commission (2012a) for information on the Greek Loan Facility and European Commission 
(2012b) for information on the European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM), the European Financial 
Stability Facility (EFSF) and the rescue packages provided for Ireland and Portugal. 
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Irish government finally decided to request assistance by European rescue funds and the IMF 
(€ 85 Billion). In spring 2011, the Portuguese government had to do the same (€ 78 Billion). 
And in the course of 2011 the Greek government debt problem worsened again, such that in 
late 2011 a 50 per cent voluntary loss of private holdings of Greek government and an 
increase and extension of the rescue package were agreed. 
 
Figure 3:  
General government financial balance relative to GDP, selected Euro area countries, 
1995 to 2010, in per cent 
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Source: European Commission (2011a), author’s calculations  
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Figure 4:  
General government gross consolidated debt relative to GDP, selected Euro area 
countries, 1995-2010, in per cent 
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Source: European Commission (2011a), author’s calculations  
 
Figure 5:  
10-year government bond yields, selected Euro area countries, January 2007 – 
November 2011, in per cent 
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Since mainstream economics and economic policy debates see the high and rising government 
debts as the main reason for the crisis, the failure of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) to 
contain government deficits and debt is therefore the most important problem to be tackled in 
the Euro area. From that point of view the main threat for the euro is caused by governments, 
which have run irresponsibly high deficits leading public finances to the brink of default. 
Therefore, the current debate over the reform of the economic policy framework in the 
European Union (EU) and the Euro area is still dominated by the paradigm that has led to the 
crisis.  
However, some important urgency measures have been taken to stabilise financial 
markets and prevent government defaults. These are, first, the introduction of the European 
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) as well as the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism 
(EFSM) and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which will assume the role of 
providing external financial assistance to Euro area member states in trouble after June 2013 
or even in 2012, and most recently the extensions of the stabilization tools for the EFSM and 
ESM agreed at the meeting of the heads of state or government of the Euro area and EU 
institutions in July 2011 (Council of the EU 2011b). Second, and maybe more importantly, 
the interventions of the ECB into secondary government bonds markets, buying government 
debt of those countries which are in trouble, have so far prevented a collapse of these markets 
and have provided some relief for the countries under attack.8 
But these measures are far from solving the major institutional deficiencies, i.e. the 
lack of an explicit guarantee of public debt of member countries by the ECB. The recent 
meeting of the European Council (2011b) in December 2011 has not even considered the 
proposal of Eurobonds (or Stability Bonds) put forward by the European Commission (2011b) 
which could have been a first step towards the remedy of the problems, and there is no 
general political support – to say the least – for the interventions of the ECB into government 
                                                 
8
 For information on these interventions see ECB (2011b). 
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bonds markets aimed at stabilising these markets and dampening the upwards pressure on 
interest rates on government debt. 
Further more, the rescue measures for the financial sector have been combined with 
the requirements of restrictive fiscal and wage policies as conditions to get access to the EFSF 
and the ESM, a tighter SGP, a new ‘Euro Plus Pact’, and a ‘New Fiscal Compact’ among 
Euro area member countries, which will impose deflationary pressures on major parts of the 
Euro area and will thus prevent stabilisation (or reduction) of public debt-GDP ratios.9  
In March 2011, for example, the European Council (2011a, p. 2) “endorsed the 
priorities for fiscal consolidation and structural reform. It underscored the need to give 
priority to restoring sound budgets and fiscal sustainability, reducing unemployment through 
labour market reforms and making new efforts to enhance growth”. In particular, the 
European Council (2011a, p. 2) requires reductions of the structural budget deficits of “well 
above 0.5 per cent of GDP” for 2012 in most countries, in order to restore ‘confidence’.10 The 
‘Euro Plus Pact’ agreed upon at the March 2011 meeting of the European Council (2011a) is 
hence mainly targeted at improving competitiveness by means of monitoring wage setting, in 
particular in the public sector, at labour market reforms increasing ‘flexicurity’, life-long 
learning and reducing taxes on low-paid labour, and at improving sustainability of public 
finances by means of extending effective retirement ages, reducing early retirement and 
implementing fiscal rules (i.e. ‘debt brakes’) into national legislation. These commitments in 
the ‘Euro Plus Pact’ shall be reflected in the annual National Reform and the Stability 
Programmes, which are assessed by the Commission, the Council, and the Eurogroup in the 
                                                 
9
 See the agreements of the meeting of the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) on 15 March 
2011 (Council of the EU 2011a), the conclusions of the meeting of the European Council (2011a) on 24/25 
March 2011, the statement by the heads of state or government of the Euro area and EU institutions on 21 July 
2011 (Council of the EU 2011b), and state by the Euro area heads of state and governments on 9 December 2011 
(European Council 2011b). 
10
 See also the agreement the ECOFIN regarding the reform of the SGP and the surveillances of economic 
policies (Council of the EU 2011a). 
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context of the so called European Semester, and will thus have a major impact on European 
economic policies in the years to come.  
This approach has been underlined by the agreement of the Euro area heads of state 
and governments in December 2011 (European Council 2011b). The ‘New Fiscal Compact’ 
reinforces the target of balanced or in surplus government budgets, i.e. structural deficits shall 
not exceed 0.5 per cent of GDT. This target shall be introduced into the national legal systems 
at a constitutional level. Further more, deviations from this target shall trigger automatic 
correction mechanisms. Such automatism, including sanctions imposed by the European 
Commission, shall also be applied if a country breaches the 3 per cent of GDP limit for its 
government deficit, unless a qualified majority of the Euro area member states opposes. 
Furthermore, it has been agreed to reduce government debt exceeding the 60 per cent of GDP 
threshold, irrespective of the macroeconomic constellation. 
Taking a look at the data, many doubts regarding the interpretation of mainstream 
European policy advisers and makers regarding the origin of the euro crisis are raised (Figure 
3). For Greece, of course, the picture seems clear, as the budget deficit was outstandingly 
large over the whole period since the mid-1990s. For Portugal, however, the picture is less 
clear, as the budget deficit was not larger than that of Germany for a long period of time. And 
most strikingly, both Ireland and Spain looked perfectly well before the crisis as they seemed 
to follow the SGP in an almost ideal manner. Ireland ran a budget surplus of 3 per cent of 
GDP in 2006 and Spain had a surplus of 1.9 per cent in 2007. Turning to gross government 
debt in relation to GDP (Figure 4), the evidence for the purely fiscal view of the crisis 
becomes even weaker: Portugal used to have a considerably smaller debt burden than 
Germany. And in 2007 gross government debt in relation to GDP was only 25 per cent in 
Ireland and 36 per cent in Spain, far below the 60 per cent threshold of the SGP.  
 21 
Figure 6:  
Sectoral financial balances as a percentage share of nominal GDP, selected Euro area 
countries, 1995 - 2010 
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6b) Belgium 
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6c) France 
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6d) Germany 
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6e) Greece 
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6f) Ireland 
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6g) Italy 
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6h) Netherlands 
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6i) Portugal 
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6j) Spain 
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
Private sector Public sector External sector
 
Source: European Commission (2011a), author’s calculations  
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We observe a more complex picture, which against the background of the aforementioned 
institutional and economic policy deficiencies help to explain the current euro crisis,11 if we 
take into account the interconnection of public, private and foreign deficits and surpluses: 
0 
 balancefinancial sector  Foreign 
 balancefinancial sector  Private 
 balancefinancial sector  Public 
=
+
+
       (1) 
The dynamic debt-led consumption boom development before the crisis in Ireland 
(Figure 6f) and Spain (Figure 6j) was associated with huge deficits of the private sector and 
(relatively small) surpluses in the government balances and to a much larger extent with 
current account deficits against the rest of the world, i.e. surpluses of the respective external 
sectors. When the crisis hit, the private sector balances quickly turned into surplus and 
governments stabilising the economy had to accept dramatic increases in government deficits. 
Therefore, the ‘unsustainable’ government deficit turns out to be a consequence of probably 
unsustainable private and external sector balances before the crisis in the first place. 
For the two other economies currently included in the rescue packages, Greece (Figure 
6e), a debt-led consumption boom type, and Portugal (Figure 6i), a domestic demand-led type 
of economy before the crisis, both the private sector and the government sector continuously 
ran deficits after the introduction of the euro. Those deficits had to be financed by capital 
inflows and hence current account deficits of about 12 per cent of GDP in the case of Greece, 
and about 10 per cent of GDP in the case of Portugal, before the crisis. In the course of the 
financial and real crises, in both countries the government stepped in to prevent the economy 
from collapsing when the private sector reduced deficits or turned into surplus again, leading 
to rising public deficits. 
Therefore, it seems that the current euro crisis is rooted in earlier private deficits and 
current account imbalances and has not been caused by excessive public deficits. In the four 
                                                 
11
 For similar explanations see Uxo/Paul/Febrero (2011) and Stockhammer (2011). 
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countries outlined above, the private sector obviously tended to spend more than its income. 
This was associated with government surpluses (Ireland, Spain) or amplified by government 
deficits (Portugal, Greece), which led to very high and rising current account deficits in the 
four countries.  
For Italy, a domestic demand-led economy before the crisis, the picture is less clear 
(Figure 6g). In this country the private sector balance was consistently positive. Therefore the 
government deficit could be financed partly by the private sector surplus and partly by the 
capital inflows associated with the moderate, but continuously rising, current account deficit. 
When the crisis hit, the improvement in the private sector balance was compensated mostly by 
an increase in the government deficit. A similar pattern can be observed for France (Figure 
6c), another domestic demand-led economy in the Euro area. What is worrisome in both 
cases, is the continuous improvement of the external sector balances in both countries, i.e. the 
continuous deterioration of the respective current accounts. 
Since the current account of the Euro area as a whole has been roughly balanced in the 
period before the crisis, there must have been other countries within the Euro area in which 
the private sector has consistently run surpluses. If in such cases the government is not willing 
(or is prevented by the SGP) to run a correspondingly high deficit, then this will imply a 
deficit of the respective foreign sectors, i.e. current account surpluses. It does not come as a 
surprise that these characteristics hold for the export-led mercantilist countries of the Euro 
area Germany (Figure 6d), the Netherlands (Figure 6h), Austria (Figure 6a), and Belgium 
(Figure 6b), with Germany as the largest Euro area country being the most important one.12 
So far we have argued that in order to explain the euro crisis we should not focus on 
the government financial balances only, but should take into account the financial balances of 
all three macroeconomic sectors. This has brought into the fore again the current account 
                                                 
12
 For a more detailed analysis and critique of the mercantilist macroeconomic policy strategy in Germany and 
its implications for the imbalances in the Euro area see Hein/Truger (2007, 2009, 2010) and Cesaratto/Stirati 
(2010). 
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imbalances among Euro area member countries which have escalated since the introduction of 
the euro. As we have outlined in Section 3, these imbalances have been the outcome of the 
two extreme ‘types of development of capitalism under financialisation’, i.e. the ‘debt-led 
consumption boom’ type, on the one hand, and the ‘export-led mercantilist’ type, on the other 
hand, which have also been observed in the Euro area in the face of financial deregulation and 
re-distribution at the expense of (low) labour incomes. Only in the crisis of finance-dominated 
capitalism these imbalances triggered rising public deficit- and debt-GDP ratios which then, 
given the institutional lack of a convincing guarantee of public sector debt in the Euro area, 
provided the grounds for the euro crisis. 
 
5. Getting out of the crisis 
Getting out of the euro crisis requires addressing the long-run developments of finance-
dominated capitalism which have caused the crisis of this type of capitalism, i.e. the 
inefficient regulation of financial markets, the increased inequality in income distribution, and 
the imbalances in the current accounts at the global and the European level, on the one hand. 
In Hein/Truger (2011) we have proposed a “Keynesian New Deal at the Global and the 
European Level” in order to tackle these roots of the crisis.13 This policy package should 
include, first, the re-regulation of the financial sector in order to prevent future financial 
excesses and financial crises, second, the re-orientation of macroeconomic policies towards 
stimulating and stabilising domestic demand, in particular in the current account surplus 
countries, and third, the re-construction of international macroeconomic policy co-ordination 
and a new world financial order, in order to rebalance the world and the regional economies. 
Within this broader framework, on the other hand, the European Union and the Euro area will 
                                                 
13
 See also Hein (2012, chapter 7). 
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have to overcome the specific institutional and economic policy failures which have made the 
financial and economic crises a euro crisis, in particular.14 
In what follows we will focus on the requirements to overcome the euro crisis, and we 
will base our arguments on the Post-Keynesian approach to macroeconomics and 
macroeconomic policies developed in Hein/Stockhammer (2010) as an alternative to the now 
discredited New Consensus macroeconomics, on which much of the existing economic policy 
framework in the Euro area is built.15 In order to improve the growth rate of the Euro area as a 
whole and to provide the conditions and incentives for each country to grow at a rate 
consistent with roughly balanced current accounts, major institutional reforms in the EU and 
the Euro area are required.16 
First, the institutional setting of the ECB and its monetary policy strategy have to be 
modified so that the ECB is forced to take into account the long-run distribution, employment 
and growth effects of its policies, and to pursue a monetary policy targeting low real interest 
rates. In a first step, an adjustment towards the objectives of the US Federal Reserve might be 
helpful, which include stable prices, maximum employment and moderate long-term interest 
rates on an equal footing (Meyer 2001). In its monetary policy strategy the ECB should 
refrain from fine tuning the economy in real or nominal terms and should rather target low 
interest rates, such that long-term real interest rates remain below Euro area average 
productivity growth in the medium run. This should be conducive to real investment and 
growth in the Euro area as a whole. The ECB, moreover, ought to focus on financial market 
stability. Instead of the blunt instrument of the interest rate it should introduce those 
instruments which are appropriate to contain bubbles in specific asset markets in specific 
                                                 
14
 On the ‘design faults’ of the European Monetary and Economic Union see more extensively Arestis/Sawyer 
(2011), however, without establishing any relationship of the euro crisis with the crisis of finance-dominated 
capitalism. 
15
 For the NCM see Goodfriend/King (1997), Clarida/Gali/Gertler (1999) and Woodford (2003), and for detailed 
critiques of the NCM and its application in economic policy making, see Arestis (2009, 2011a, 2011b), 
Arestis/Sawyer (2004a), and Hein/Stockhammer (2010). 
16
 On the determinants of the balance of payments constrained growth rate see Thirlwall (1979, 2002) and on the 
application of this concept to the analysis of the imbalances within a currency area, i.e. the euro area, see 
Hein/Truger/van Treeck (2012) and Hein (2012, chapter 8). 
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countries or regions, i.e. credit controls or asset-based reserve requirements (Palley 2010). 
Further more, the ECB should act as a lender of last resort to the banking system, and it 
should guarantee public debt of the Euro area member countries, allowing these countries to 
issue debt in their ‘own currency’. This would immediately reduce the pressure imposed by 
‘financial markets’ on those countries presently in crisis and would provide the conditions for 
a long-run oriented solution to the current account imbalances within the Euro area. 
Second, the orientation of labour market and social policies towards deregulation and 
flexibilisation, still prevalent in the EU and the Euro area, will have to be abandoned in favour 
of re-organising labour markets, stabilising labour unions and employer associations, and 
adopting Euro area-wide minimum wage legislation.17 This could provide the institutional 
requirements for the effective implementation of nominal stabilising wage policies. Nominal 
wages should rise according to the sum of long-run average growth of labour productivity in 
the national economy plus the target rate of inflation for the Euro area as a whole. This would 
contribute to roughly equal inflation rates across the Euro area, and it would prevent 
mercantilist strategies based on nominal wage moderation. 
Third, the SGP at the European level has to be abandoned and needs to be replaced by 
a means of coordination of national fiscal policies at the Euro area level which allows for the 
short- and long-run stabilising role of fiscal policies. Hein/Truger (2007) have suggested the 
coordination of long-run expenditure paths for non-cyclical government spending, i.e. those 
components of spending which are under control of the government. Such expenditure paths 
could be geared towards stabilising aggregate demand in the Euro area at full employment 
levels, and automatic stabilisers plus discretionary counter-cyclical fiscal policies could be 
applied to fight demand shocks. In order to avoid current account imbalances within the Euro 
area, these expenditure paths would have to make sure of the following: On average over the 
cycle and the average tax rate in each member country given, as a first approximation, the 
                                                 
17
 Of course, this does not imply the same minimum wage rate for the whole Euro area, but country-specific 
minimum wages, which, however, should be set according to some Euro area wide rule. 
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government deficits in single countries, i.e. government spending (G) minus taxes (T), would 
have to be roughly equal to the excess of private saving (S) over private investment (I) in the 
respective country, such that the current accounts are roughly balanced at a high level of 
aggregate demand and employment (S – I = G – T),18 and GDP growth is close to the balance 
of payments constrained growth rate of the individual country.  
As we have shown in Sections and 3 and 4 above, the basic problem underlying the 
present euro crisis, apart from the absence of a convincing guarantee of Euro area member 
country public debt by the ECB, are the massive current account imbalances which have 
developed within the Euro area. Whereas on average over the pre-crisis period, GDP growth 
in Greece, Ireland, Spain and Portugal has exceeded their respective balance of payments 
constrained growth rates, GDP growth in Austria, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands has 
fallen short of the respective balance of payments constrained growth rates. From this it 
follows, that the immediate task for the member countries is to adjust actual growth to the 
respective balance of payments constrained growth rates. This orientation is important in 
order to rebalance economic development in the Euro area, even if the ECB would guarantee 
public debt of Euro area member countries and thus contribute to stabilising the markets for 
public sector debt. However, we will conditionally relax this requirement below. 
For the current account surplus countries this means that they should use expansive 
fiscal policies to increase domestic demand and adjust actual growth towards their balance of 
payments constrained growth rates. This provides the conditions for the current account 
deficit countries to reduce their deficits. For a transitional period, the current account surplus 
countries should also increase their rates of inflation relative to the rates of inflation in the 
current account deficit countries, in order to rebalance price competitiveness among Euro area 
member countries. Unit labour cost growth should therefore exceed the wage norm mentioned 
                                                 
18
 This is, of course, the functional finance approach proposed by Lerner (1942) and more recently again by 
Arestis/Sawyer (2004b). 
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above, i.e. the sum of national productivity growth plus the Euro area inflation target, during 
the adjustment process. 
The major task for the current account deficit countries, with the exception of 
Ireland,19 will be to improve their balance of payments constrained growth rates. This means, 
on the one hand, to contribute to a reduction of the inflation differentials with respect to the 
surplus countries, by means of unit labour cost growth below the sum of national productivity 
growth plus the inflation target. In order to prevent the risk of deflation in these countries 
during the process of adjustment, the Euro area inflation target should be increased above the 
rather ambitious present target of ‘below, but close to 2 per cent’ for the harmonized index of 
consumer prices (HICP). On the other hand, current account deficit countries have to increase 
the income elasticity of demand for their exports and to reduce the income elasticity of 
demand for imports by means of industrial, structural and regional policies; this means they 
have to improve their non-price competitiveness.20  
Even if these adjustment processes of actual and balance of payments constrained 
growth rates in each of the Euro area member countries take place, we would not expect 
complete adjustment in the short or medium run. Growth rates of member countries will differ 
due to productivity catch-up processes and it is hard to imagine that these differences in 
growth rates will be matched by reverse differentials in inflation rates or by inverse relative 
income elasticities of demand for exports and imports. In other words, it is not very likely that 
the more rapidly growing catching up countries will have lower inflation, higher income 
elasticities of demand for their exports, and lower income elasticities of demand for imports 
than the slowly growing more advanced economies, so that actual growth differentials will be 
                                                 
19
 In the case of Ireland, the current account deficit was not due to a deficit in external trade but rather a deficit in 
the flows of primary incomes. 
20
 Following Thirlwall (2002, p. 78), “The only sure and long-term solution to raising a country’s growth rate 
consistent with balance of payments equilibrium on current account is structural change to raise ε and to reduce 
π.” Remember that ε is the income elasticity of the demand for exports and π is the income elasticity of the 
demand for imports. 
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matched exactly by balance of payments constrained growth differentials. Therefore, current 
account surpluses and deficits will arise due to these differentials.  
Coordinating fiscal policies and government deficits at the Euro area level should 
therefore take tolerable current account deficits associated with catch-up processes into 
account in the short and medium run. As shown in Hein/Truger/van Treeck (2012),21 in a 
currency union with a balanced current account with the rest of the world and therefore with a 
(close to) zero net foreign assets/liabilities position, a constant net foreign liabilities-GDP-
ratio of the current account deficit member countries will be associated with a rising net 
foreign assets-GDP-ratio of the current account surplus member countries, provided that GDP 
growth in the deficit countries exceeds growth in the surplus countries. Alternatively, a 
constant net foreign assets-GDP-ratio of the surplus countries will be accompanied by falling 
net foreign liabilities-GDP-ratios of the deficit countries, or net foreign assets-GDP-ratios of 
surplus countries will be rising and net foreign liabilities-GDP-ratios of deficit countries will 
be falling. Sustainably higher growth than that of the surplus countries on Euro area average 
should therefore be the ultimate criterion for tolerable current account deficits in the 
coordination process of fiscal policies within the Euro area. Current account deficits of 
countries with a below surplus country average GDP growth rate, and the related current 
account surpluses of the surplus countries, should not be tolerated and should be tackled 
symmetrically, i.e. by both deficit and surplus countries, with the measures outlined above. 
 Current account deficits will have to be financed by capital imports. Appropriate 
financial regulations, avoiding excessive asset price inflation and credit bubbles, are key 
prerequisites for sustainable growth and for the stability of productivity growth catch-up 
processes and the related current account deficits and net foreign liabilities position. Long-
term capital flows as a means of finance of acceptable current account deficits are therefore 
most important. Long-term direct investment may be the most stable and beneficial, but 
                                                 
21
 See also Hein (2012, chapter 8). 
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structural effects (and also the outflow of profits) have to be taken into account, as the 
example of Ireland in the recent past has taught us. If capital inflows are financed by credit, 
the focus should be on long-term credit.  
Therefore, the EU and the Euro area will have to develop institutions which take care 
of the transfer of the current account surpluses of the more slowly growing mature member 
countries to the catching-up less developed economies. First, the ECB will have to explicitly 
guarantee public debt of all member countries, current account deficit and surplus countries, 
and thus stabilise financial markets and keep interest rates on government debt below the 
long-run nominal GDP growth rate of the respective country. Second, fiscal policies among 
the Euro area member countries will have to be coordinated along the lines developed above: 
On average over the cycle and the average tax rate in each member country given, the 
government deficits would have to be roughly equal to the excess of private saving over 
private investment in the respective country, taking into account acceptable current account 
deficits or surpluses given by catch-up processes and thus differential long-run growth rates. 
Third, the European Investment Bank, together with the European regional and structural 
funds and the government institutions of the recipient countries, should be involved in 
directing private capital flows into appropriate sectors and areas of the current account deficit 
countries which facilitate real catch-up processes and avoid bubbles in certain sectors (i.e. in 
housing or financial sectors). 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we have interpreted the euro crisis in a broader context as the latest episode of 
the crisis of finance-dominated capitalism. We have analysed major features of finance-
dominated capitalism, that are the increasing inequality of income distribution and the rising 
imbalances of current accounts, for a set of major Euro area countries. Against this 
background we have then examined the euro crisis and the economic policy reactions of 
 35 
European governments and institutions. Since these policy makers narrowly interpret the 
crisis as a sovereign debt crisis caused by irresponsible behaviour of some member country 
governments, their policy reactions and recommendations focussing on constraining 
government deficits and debt by means of tighter rules and deflationary policies are doomed 
to fail and will increase the risk of deflationary stagnation and finally disintegration of the 
Euro area as a whole. Therefore, we have outlined an alternative macroeconomic policy 
approach tackling the basic contradictions of finance-dominated capitalism and the 
deficiencies of European economic policy institutions and economic policy strategies. What is 
urgently required in order to prevent a worsening of the crisis in the Euro area is, on the one 
hand, a central bank which convincingly guarantees public debt of Euro area member 
countries. On the other hand, an expansionary macroeconomic policy approach, in particular 
in the current account surplus countries of the Euro area, needs to be applied in order improve 
income distribution and to overcome the imbalances which have arisen in the past and which 
are at the roots of the crisis.  
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